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Abstract
The paper’s main aim is to identify under which conditions the criterion of
prior-independent optimality is applicable in the design of multidimensional
franchise auctions. We ﬁrst establish an impossibility result for second-score
auctions by showing that in single-crossing environments necessary and suﬃcient
condition for score functions to be optimal in this sense is that bidders have
equal variable cost functions. Then we show that the result is not conﬁned
to the second-score format but holds for any scoring auction under stochastic
independence. Therefore, a regulator who has no information at all about ﬁrms’
costs cannot in such circumstances avail himself of prior-independent optimality
as choice criterion. Conversely, if variable cost functions are equal across poten-
tial contractors, as is likely in certain public services markets, and the regulator
knows it, it is possible for him to implement a prior-independent optimum
by scoring bids according to the social welfare function under various auction
formats, including ﬁrst- and second-score auctions. This simple prescription
however no longer applies if the regulator is ignorant about market demand too.
In this case a fully rational choice of the score function is precluded, though
it may be possible to make a reasonable one: a brief discussion of this point
closes the paper.
JEL: D44, H57, L51.
I am grateful to Fioravante Patrone for a few substantial suggestions and to Nicola Doni and
Domenico Menicucci for their comments.1 Introduction
The paper studies the choice by an ignorant principal of the score function through
which multidimensional bids are evaluated in scoring auctions. The context of
reference is franchise bidding in the ﬁeld of public services where competition is
on the tariﬀ charged to customers and the subsidy granted by the regulator to the
contractor.
The score-function choice was originally studied by Che (1993) and subsequent
developments like Branco (1997); David et al. (2006); Naegelen (2002) for the case of
mono-dimensional cost uncertainty. In these papers bidders’ costs are assumed to
depend on a single uncertain parameter, which means that the principal is uncertain
either about marginal or ﬁxed costs but not both, unless they are perfectly correlated.
This assumption is of course hardly realistic, since there is no reason why the principal
should be perfectly informed about ﬁxed costs while being uncertain about marginal
ones or viceversa and the only motivation is to remove the diﬃculties of mechanism
design with multidimensional types (cf. the literature on the related problem of non-
linear monopoly pricing, Armstrong and Rochet, 1999; Laﬀont et al., 1987; McAfee
and McMillan, 1988). Here we relax this restriction by assuming that the regulator
is uncertain about both costs and allow for imperfect correlation between them. A
number of contributions are now available which analyze various aspects of scoring
auctions under multidimensional uncertainty (Asker and Cantillon, 2008; Bichler and
Kalagnanam, 2005; Bushnell and Oren, 1994; Müller et al., 2007), including optimal
design (Asker and Cantillon, 2005), within the traditional Bayesian framework. In
the present paper we depart from this approach and focus on the design of scoring
auctions by a principal who has no prior on ﬁrms’ costs.
The biggest obstacle for a principal who ignores the probability distribution
of agents’ types is that he is generally unable to a priori identify the optimal
mechanism. One way out of this diﬃculty is to look for weaker choice criteria than
expected-value optimality. For instance in the literature on selling mechanisms for
electronic platforms there has recently been an upsurge of interest in the design of
procedures for use by uninformed sellers. Choice criteria have been developed such as
“competitiveness” (Goldberg and Hartline, 2003; Goldberg et al., 2006; Hartline and
McGrew, 2005) which allow to design satisfactory, though not optimal auctions in the
complete absence of seller information about buyers. The rationale for this strand
of research is that, though some information can often be collected by the seller,
its direct costs and inaccuracy grow steeply with market size and in mass markets
standardized procedures which make no use of a priori information turn out preferable
to Bayesian ones. A diﬀerent research direction is based on the idea that mechanisms
may not only convey information on the actual realization of private values but
also on the distributions from which they are extracted. The task of designing
prior-free mechanisms capable to elicit agents’ type distributions is a general one and
a literature is developing which tackles the problem in a variety of context (cf. Baliga
and Vohra, 2003; Bergemann and Morris, 2005). Segal (2003) focuses on learning in
auctions. His main result is that, by designing auction mechanisms so as to work as
consistent estimators of the unknown cost distribution, they behave asymptotically as
optimal mechanisms in the Bayesian sense, even without the auctioneer’s knowledge
of the prior. The problem with this approach is that, while suited to sales of large
1numbers of possibly small-value units, it is not appropriate for franchise-awarding
contexts where transactions are typically of high value and involve few bidders. In a
similar vein and more closely to our topic, Beil and Wein (2003) study a multistage
multidimensional auction mechanism which allows a completely ignorant auctioneer
to gain information from myopic suppliers about their costs by progressively changing
the score function from round to round. This approach, however, has the important
limitation of being applicable only to informal auctions, where the scoring rule is not
set and announced beforehand—which is generally not the case when the auction
object is a franchise and the auction is called by a public body.
Here we take up the issue from a diﬀerent angle. We go back to the fundamentals
of auction design under ignorance by investigating what can be attained within the
class of scoring auctions with the least possible sophistication in design and the
least possible information. Though an ignorant principal will generally be unable
to single out an optimal mechanism, it need not always be so. Indeed, there may
exist mechanisms that dominate every other irrespective of the prior—i.e. prior-
independent optimal—and in such a case even an ignorant principal is able to identify
and implement them. Our main aim here is to ﬁnd out if and when such mechanisms
exist.
Two sets of results are developed. We start by asking whether in the class of
second-score auctions there exist prior-independent optimal ones. More precisely,
we ask if there are score functions which, when applied to a second-score auction,
obtain a better outcome than any other, irrespective of the prior. When variable cost
functions display the single-crossing property, it is indeed possible to characterize the
environments which admit prior-independent optimal score functions: such optima
exist if and only if all variable cost functions are equal across bidders and they
always include the social welfare function itself (Proposition 1). The “only if” part
of the characterization is in fact an impossibility result for the universal domain of
priors. A completely ignorant regulator is one who has no information at all about
environment parameters, i.e. who knows that the prior belongs to the universal prior
domain. The result tells that there exists no optimal score function with respect
to all priors in this domain, and hence the regulator will be unable to make use of
the prior-independent optimality criterion. By contrast, if variable cost functions
are equal across ﬁrms, there does exist a prior-independent optimal score function
for second-score-auctions. Since this condition in fact amounts to a restriction of
the prior ﬁeld (though not knowing the prior, the regulator knows that it belongs
to a well-deﬁned restricted domain), what we actually ﬁnd is prior-independent
optima with respect to the priors belonging to a restricted domain. This result seems
especially relevant for the market of public-service franchises: for many services such
as bus transportation, waste collection, etc., costs are indeed likely to display this
property and the regulator may be aware of this even if he has no prior on them.
A second set of results extends the basic insight in several directions and allows
to cast light on the existence of prior-independent optima in a wider context. One
might suspect that, when prior-independent optimal second-score auctions do not
exist, there may nonetheless exist optimal auctions of diﬀerent kinds: as aa matter
of fact, we are able to prove that in a few relevant cases this is certainly not true. If
variable and ﬁxed cost parameters are i.i.d. across potential contractors, it is possible
to compare welfare levels supported by diﬀerent auction mechanisms and the result
2is that all scoring auctions with the same score function are welfare-equivalent. Then
if a prior-independent optimal score function exists, it must also be optimal with
respect to the subset of priors with i.i.d. costs, which means that a prior-independent
optimal second-score one should exist even when variable cost functions diﬀer across
ﬁrms: since our characterization result for second-score auctions rules out this, the
conclusion is that no prior-independent optimal auction of any kind ever exist in
the universal domain of priors (Proposition 2). On the positive side, when variable
cost functions are equal across ﬁrms and certain additional conditions hold (namely,
ﬁxed costs independently and identically distributed across bidders) we can prove
that ﬁrst-score and second-score auctions which employ the social welfare function
to score bids are optimal in expected value both with respect to all priors in this
restricted domain and all kinds of auction mechanisms (Proposition 3).
These prescriptions all have in common the use of the social welfare function for
scoring bids. Of course, this requires that the regulator knows it, which is however
not always the case: if the welfare function is speciﬁed in the usual way as a weighted
sum of consumer and producer surpluses, a regulator who ignores market demand
ignores it too. Thus even under the equality of variable cost functions across bidders
the possibility of a fully rational choice by an ignorant regulator vanishes altogether
and a new problem arises. When a generic score function is applied to a ﬁrst- or
second-score auction under the equality of variable-cost parameters across bidders,
our results tell that what is actually maximized is an objective coincident with that
score function. In other words, the regulator in fact behaves as if he pursued this
objective, which will in general be diﬀerent from his natural one. To stress the
diﬀerence we call this second sort of objectives pseudo-objectives. Then, instead of
assessing diﬀerent score functions against an a priori given natural objective, he has
to ﬁnd a pseudo-objective that is reasonable in some sense. How this is to be done
is a question that falls outside the paper’s scope but we want to stress one point.
Though ignorant in a Bayesian sense, regulators may and do often have a priori
information that can help restrict the choice ﬁeld in a signiﬁcant way. The restriction
process will not generally single out a unique score function but may however be
enough to drop from consideration a good number of them and even some that are
commonly used in regulatory practice.
The paper is organized as follows. After laying out the model in section 2,
we study prior-independent optimal second-score auctions in section 3. Section 4
presents an impossibility result for generic scoring auctions. In section 5 a few results
are developed about optimal auctions under the restriction of equal variable cost
functions across ﬁrms. In section 6 we tackle the problem of ignorance about market
demand and we show how our results on prior-independent optimality allow in certain
cases to devise pragmatic solutions to the auction design problems under this further
restriction.
2 The model
A regulator is to select a contractor for the provision of a public service. Firm i’s
cost of service supply y is c(y;mi) + Fi, where Fi is the ﬁxed cost, 0 < Fi < 1, and
mi is a variable-cost parameter which varies over some interval (c(0;mi) = 0 for all
mi). These parameters are private information to the ﬁrm. We denote service tariﬀ
3p and the (possibly negative) subsidy granted to the contractor s. Service demand
at every p is y(p) and the contractor’s proﬁt is





Demand and cost functions are of usual shape (respectively decreasing and increasing
in y) and continuous. The regulator’s objective is to maximize social welfare which
we assume to be speciﬁed in the standard fashion after Baron and Myerson (1982)
W(p;s;m;F) = CS(p)   s + (p;s;m;F) (1)
where CS(p) is the consumer surplus and  is a distributive parameter such that
0 6  < 1. Moreover we assume that the regulator has no prior on ﬁrms’ costs (later
on we shall discuss the implications of ignorance about demand functions as well).
Scoring auctions are perhaps the most frequent procedure for awarding franchises
and quite common in other contexts too. The focus of our analysis is the design
of such auctions and to this purpose we assume that the regulator’s choice is a
priori restricted to them to the exclusion of other formats (like e.g. the full-surplus
extraction auctions of Crémer and McLean, 1988, and McAfee and Reny, 1992).
A scoring auction is a particular sort of one-shot multidimensional auction where
bids are contract proposals, in our case denoted (p;s), each bid gets a score V (p;s)
according to some score function V : R+  R ! R, the highest-score bidder wins
and the implemented contract is chosen by the winner under the constraint that it
matches some score computed from realized individual scores through a predetermined
algorithm. Throughout we assume that losers pay nothing. This class of auction rules
includes two popular awarding mechanisms like ﬁrst- and second-score auctions which
have been extensively studied in the literature (Asker and Cantillon, 2008; Branco,
1997; Che, 1993) and which will be a major focus of our analysis too. Under the
ﬁrst-score rule the implemented contract is the winner’s bid. Second-score auctions
are extensions of second-price ones where the winner is free to choose any contract
with a score at least as great as the second-highest one.
Score functions are chosen by the regulator and the choice is restricted to functions
that are continuous, decreasing in p and strictly decreasing in s. Auction mechanisms
also usually specify a reserve value for each bid variable but here, in view of the
regulator’s severe informational constraints, are assumed as given and hence fall
outside the scope of our analysis. As a consequence, in this model the choice of an
auction mechanism in fact reduces to the choice of a score function and a rule of
contract determination based on realized individual scores. Moreover, to simplify
calculations we also assume that, unless indicated otherwise, reserve values are inﬁnite,
as in Branco (1997) and Che (1993), and that all ﬁrm types always participate in
the auction as e.g. in Branco (1997); Che (1993); Riordan and Sappington (1987)
(hence we eschew the problems of exclusion/non-participation that typically arise in
multidimensional adverse-selection environments, cf. Armstrong, 1996; Jehiel et al.,
1999; Rochet and Choné, 1998; Rochet and Stole, 2002).
In sum, our model coincides with that of Che (1993) except in two main respects—
that here we have two uncertain cost parameters instead of one and, above all, the
regulator has no prior on cost functions. Without such information full rationality is
generally out of reach for an ignorant and unsophisticated regulator but there are
4cases where even such a decision maker can make fully rational choices: this is the
object of our enquiry in the next sections.
3 Second-score auctions
The task of a Bayesian regulator is straightforward: to select the score function
which implements the contract yielding the highest expected welfare with respect
to his prior distribution of mi and Fi. A regulator who has no prior information
is instead unable to work out the expected welfare attainable through alternative
mechanisms. There is however a case in which this limitation is irrelevant and
even an unsophisticated regulator can compute social optima—when there exists a
prior-independent optimal score function, i.e. one which maximizes expected welfare
for all possible priors. A special case of it, with which we shall extensively deal in the
subsequent analysis, is when a score function is pointwise optimal, i.e. maximizes not
only expected welfare for all priors but also ex-post welfare state by state. The study
of such optima is one of the main themes of this section. As we shall see, restrictive
though the prior-independence criterion is, the optimal design problem does admit
solutions under it in a few economically signiﬁcant environments.
We proceed in two steps. A social welfare function is independent of the state
of the world when it is such that W(p;s;m;F) = ^ W(p;s) for every p;s;m;F. We
ﬁrst focus on welfare functions of this kind with ^ W strictly decreasing in s and
characterize prior-independent optimal auctions in the class of second-score ones
under this restriction. Then we will extend the results to diﬀerent auctions and more
general welfare functions.
Second-score auctions have dominant-strategy equilibria like second-price ones:
the following is a preliminary result that is obtained as a straightforward extension
to our context of the standard characterization of second-price equilibria (the proof
is an easy exercise and is therefore omitted).
Lemma 1 Second-score auctions with a score function V continuous and monotonic
decreasing in s always have a dominant-strategy equilibrium where equilibrium bids
are those which maximize the bidder’s score subject to the zero-proﬁt constraint.
A convenient way to approach prior-independent optimality is to start from
pointwise optimality which is easier to characterize. Score functions that are optimal
in the former sense are also optimal in the latter and, as we shall see, in many
situations the converse holds true too. In the cases where this one-to-one correspon-
dence holds the characterization of prior-independent optimal score functions reduces
to a characterization of pointwise optimal ones. In this subsection the main focus
is on the latter and the ﬁrst result is a suﬃcient condition for the existence of a
pointwise-optimal score function.
Lemma 2 If variable cost functions are equal across ﬁrms for all production levels
the regulator’s welfare function is a pointwise-optimal score function for second-score
auctions.
Proof. Consider any realization of the parameters under the restriction mi = m
for all i, i.e. m;F1;F2;:::;Fn, and without loss of generality assume that Fi 6
5Figure 1: Equality of variable cost functions across ﬁrms is suﬃcient
for pointwise optimality
Fi+1;i = 1;:::;n   1. By Lemma 1, under welfare function ^ W as score function,
the second-highest bid belongs to bidder 2’s zero-proﬁt locus and to the highest
iso-welfare curve, as in Fig. 1. This is also the auction outcome since the winner,
tough free to choose a contract diﬀerent from (p2;s2), has no incentive to do so
(this is just the most advantageous contract among those totalling a score equal
to the second-highest one): whenever bidders diﬀer only in ﬁxed costs, and hence
all ﬁrms’ iso-proﬁt curves have the same shape, the implemented contract and the
second-highest bid always coincide. Now take any score function that at least in
one state induces the second-highest bidder to choose a point on his iso-proﬁt curve
2 = 0 that does not maximize the regulator’s welfare (if this were not true, the score
function would be equivalent to ^ W). Then also the contract implemented under the
new score function will entail a (weakly) lower welfare than that implemented under
^ W (i.e. (p2;s2) of Fig. 1). In conclusion, by adopting a score function diﬀerent from
^ W the regulator obtains a (weakly) lower welfare in every m;F1;F2;:::;Fn. In other
words, ^ W dominates every V as score function in every state. 
Remark 1 When parameter m is common knowledge we are in the particular case
studied by Che (1993) and the existence result can be obtained in a diﬀerent way too.
Che shows (Proposition 4) that in his special set-up the distortion of the optimal score
function relative to the social welfare depends multiplicatively on the cross-derivative
c0
ym. Since the latter annihilates if m is common knowledge and ﬁxed costs are
uncertain, the optimal distortion annihilates too and the optimality of the social
welfare function as score function immediately follows.
The economic intuition underlying this result is quite simple. When mi is the
same for every i, bidders diﬀer at most in ﬁxed costs (i.e. have the same isoproﬁt
6Figure 2: A ^ W that is not pointwise optimal
curves with a diﬀerent scale, (p;s;m;Fi) = (p;s;m;Fj)   Fi + Fj;8i;8j). Then,
since by deﬁnition the second-highest bid is the welfare-maximizing one subject to
the zero-proﬁt constraint, in every state this also coincides with the highest-proﬁt
bid for the winner subject to the second score. Therefore a displacement of the score
function from ^ W shifts the second bid and the implemented contract to a (weakly)
lower-welfare position along the curve 2 = 0.
To see what happens when the implemented contract does not coincide with
the second highest bid let us have a look at Fig. 2. Here the welfare function ^ W
is used to score bids and a and b2 are respectively the implemented contract and
the second-score bid in the state of the world to which the depicted curves i refer
(to simplify notation, here and in the following we assume without loss of generality
that the i-th ranked bidder coincides with i). In the given situation there also exists
another score function V (throughout V will denote generic score functions) under
which the second-score bid is b0
2 and the implemented contract is a couple c such that
^ W(c) > ^ W(a). This means that in the state of the world represented in the ﬁgure
^ W supports an outcome inferior to that supported by V and hence is not pointwise
optimal. Note that for the result it is not required that V be welfare-improving over
^ W in all states of the world but it is enough that it is so in at least one state. It is also
to be noted that the mere existence of a curve like V in some state is not enough to
conclude that ^ W is not optimal. Suppose that in the ﬁgure we had 1(a) = 0 in place
of 1(a) > 0, i.e. that the iso-proﬁt curve through a were the zero-proﬁt one. Then
there would actually be two equilibria in that state—one with a and the other with b2
as implemented contract —both of which are full-information optima, i.e. contracts
that could be indiﬀerently chosen by the regulator if he had full knowledge of the state
of the world: when this is the case, the divergence between ﬁrst and second-score
bids in one state does not cause ^ W to be dominated. Except in this special case,
7however, ^ W cannot be pointwise optimal if there exist curves like V of Fig. 2 and this
occurs whenever the implemented contract and the second-score bid do not coincide.
Lemma 4 of the appendix provides a formal and general proof which applies to any
score function, not only ^ W: in conclusion, the pointwise optimality of any score
function requires in every state either the coincidence between implemented and
second-score bid or that the implemented contract be a full-information optimum.
Intuitively, the divergence between implemented contract and second bid in one
state reﬂects diﬀerent trade-oﬀs between tariﬀ and subsidy across bidders (i.e. iso-
proﬁt curves are not vertical translations of one another). This causes bidders to
reply diﬀerently to displacements of the score function and it is just these diﬀerences
that allow to attain welfare improvements in that state. In particular, in the example
of Fig. 2 the winner has a lower marginal substitution rate of s for p, i.e. he demands
less than the second-ranked ﬁrm as compensating tariﬀ increase for a given subsidy
reduction. Then, by switching from ^ W to a ﬂatter score function like V (i.e. by
putting less weight on tariﬀ) the second bidder is induced to substitute subsidy
for tariﬀ and the new iso-score touches a lower iso-proﬁt curve of the winner. If
variations are not too large, the shift of the implemented contract from a to c brings
about an improvement in welfare as is represented in the ﬁgure (note that here bidder
2 over-reacts, as it were, by “asking” for a larger tariﬀ increase and thus reduces the
welfare level attached to the second bid, but this is not relevant to the regulator who
is only interested in the welfare attached to the implemented contract).
This result allows to characterize environments—essentially cost functions—which
admit pointwise optimal score functions for second-score auctions. As we have seen,
the alternative requirements for a score function to be pointwise optimal are that in
every state it supports a full-information optimum or that the implemented contract
coincides with the second-score bid. On the other hand, if ﬁxed costs Fi vary
continuously, the latter requirement is always to be met and hence there will never
exist a pointwise optimal score function unless the coincidence condition holds in
every state, as is easy to verify. Suppose that in some state we have a 6= b2 and the
winner’s proﬁt is null, 1(a) = 0, i.e. outcome a is a full-information optimum in that
state (without loss of generality we keep assuming that 1 is the winner and 2 the
second-highest bidder). If F1 is the winner’s ﬁxed cost, a slight reduction of it will
cause no change in the outcome if parameters F2;:::;Fn;m1;:::;mn, do not change
(the winner will still be 1, a the implemented contract, and so on) but the winner’s
proﬁt will now be positive. This means that there exists at least one state of the
world where the outcome of a second-score auction is not a full-information optimum,
which proves that the coincidence of implemented contract and second bid in every
state is necessary here for pointwise optimality (a formal statement of this argument
is found in the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix). Then what we must look for
is environments where the coincidence condition holds in every state of the world.
We have already found a suﬃcient structural condition which guarantees it—
the equality of variable cost functions across ﬁrms, mi = m;8i (Lemma 2)—but
unfortunately this condition is not necessary as Fig. 3 makes clear. In this case
all isoproﬁt curves 1 > 0 lie in the epigraph of 2 = 0 and ^ W is optimal as score
function in the state to which the depicted curves refer (if we take any score function
V , the iso-score curve through the second bid b2 has no intersection with the interior
of the epigraph of 2 = 0 and hence at no point on it proﬁts can be larger than at a).
8Figure 3: Equality of variable cost functions across ﬁrms is not
necessary for pointwise optimality
If this holds true in every state of the world, there clearly exists no V that strictly
dominates ^ W pointwise and therefore this is pointwise optimal despite variable-cost
functions are not equal across ﬁrms.
A natural question at this point is whether by coupling the equality condition
with appropriate restrictions on the environment one can come to a complete char-
acterization of pointwise optimal score functions. The answer is positive but it is
possible to identify more than one class of such functions in this way. Here we present
a characterization result that is especially interesting for it holds under a property
which is common to many models of mechanism design – the single-crossing property




Under it diﬀerent types’ iso-proﬁt curves cross once and only once and the case of
Fig. 3 never occurs: with diﬀerentiable functions contract a has the characteristics of



















 F2, but the single crossing property is incompatible
with the ﬁrst condition for m1 6= m2. In the class of environments displaying this
property there holds the following characterization of prior-independent optimal
score functions (proof in the appendix).
Proposition 1 In environments where cost functions display the single-crossing
property there exist pointwise optimal score functions for second-score auctions if and
only if variable cost functions do not vary across ﬁrms for all production levels, and
one of them is ^ W.
Proposition 1 has immediate implications for prior-independent optimality. In second-
9score auctions any pointwise-optimal score function is also prior-independent optimal
in the universal domain of priors and viceversa. The ﬁrst implication is obvious and
requires no comment. The reverse can easily be established ex absurdo by assuming
that V is prior-independent optimal but not pointwise optimal. For this to be true
there must be at least one state where some ~ V supports a strictly better contract with
respect to social welfare ^ W than that supported by V (recall that in dominant-strategy
equilibria both outcomes and ex-post utilities are independent of the prior in every
state). Then, by taking a prior with a suﬃciently large probability mass concentrated
on this state, we can make the expected social welfare attained by ~ V larger than
that attained by V with respect to this prior, thus contradicting the assumption
that V is prior-independent optimal. In other words, in the universal domain of
priors there is a one-to-one correspondence between pointwise and prior-independent
optimality in second-score auctions. This and Proposition 1 imply that in the class
of single-crossing environments there is a boundary beyond which the search for a
prior-independent optimal score function fails: such functions simply do not exist for
second-score auctions except when variable-cost functions are equal across ﬁrms. In
other words, there exists no score function prior-independent optimal with respect
to all possible priors. Therefore for a completely ignorant regulator who is unable
to delimit the prior domain in any way, and hence has to work with the universal
one, the prior-independent optimality criterion will be wholly useless. However, even
a non-Bayesian regulator may sometimes have available a priori information that,
though insuﬃcient to identify the true prior, allows to restrict the domain which
contains it in such a way that the prior-independent optimization problem has a
solution constrained to the restricted domain. The “if” part of Proposition 1 gives
a precise answer to this question: in the family of environments characterized by
mi = mj for every i;j, the social welfare function is prior-independent optimal for
second-score auctions.
Note that, even though we have so far assumed that welfare functions are
independent of the winner’s type, i.e. are of the form ^ W(p;s), the result holds with
the more general functions W deﬁned by Eq. (1) too. When variable cost functions
diﬀer across ﬁrms and the single-crossing property holds, implemented contract and
second bid diﬀer in every state and the argument of Lemma 4 of the appendix (Fig. 2)
can be replicated for functions W too: the negative conclusion on the existence
of a prior-independent optimal V then remains valid even when the social welfare
function is of form W. In the next section this impossibility result is extended to
generic auction mechanisms.
4 Impossibility of optimal generic auctions in the univer-
sal prior domain
Proposition 1 allows to pinpoint precisely in which prior domains the prior-independent
optimization problem has solutions for second-score auctions. A further question is
if anything substantial changes when we remove the restriction on the auction type,
and particularly if better outcomes are attainable from the regulator’s standpoint
through other auction mechanisms. The comparison in terms of expected welfare
between diﬀerent auction structures is generally hard to make unless score functions
10are separable—an assumption on which most of the existing literature on regulatory
design and scoring auctions is founded. Here we follow suit and from now on we
restrict ourselves to social welfare functions that are linearly separable in subsidy,
i.e. ^ W(p;s)  w(p)   s, and also restrict the choice to separable score functions,
V (p;s)  v(p)   s.
The interesting fact is that under the single-crossing property allowing for auction
rules other than the second-score one brings about no welfare improvement, since
either there exists no solution to the prior-independent optimization problem or the
solution is the social welfare function itself in essentially the same cases as before.
To check this we ﬁrst verify that an impossibility result for the universal prior
domain holds true here too. The basic instrument for comparing diﬀerent auction
mechanisms is the revenue-equivalence argument. Asker and Cantillon (2008) develop
a version of it for scoring auctions and multidimensional types that ﬁts precisely into
the present framework. Consider the set of stochastically independent distributions
of types (1;2;:::;n), where i = (mi;Fi). Firm i’s maximum apparent social
surplus
ki(mi;Fi)  max
p [v(p) + py(p)   c(y(p);mi)   Fi]
is called the pseudotype of that ﬁrm by Asker and Cantillon (the expression in
square brackets is just ordinary surplus with the willingness to pay replaced by the
tariﬀ score v(p)). Under the conditions assumed here (namely, separability and risk
neutrality) scoring auctions are equivalent to auctions where bidders make statements
about their own pseudotype and the highest one wins (Asker and Cantillon, 2008,
Theorem 1). Since these auctions are actually equivalent to standard price auctions
where reservation values are replaced with pseudotypes, they enjoy the same basic
properties and in particular they are awarded to the highest pseudotype in every
state of the world (equilibrium strategies are monotonic increasing in the pseudotype).
Then, if any two scoring auctions with the same separable score function are such
that the winner is the same in every vector of pseudotypes and the lowest pseudotype
gets the same expected utility in both of them, the auctioneer’s expected utility is
invariant across the two auctions (Asker and Cantillon, 2008, Theorem 2).
In light of this revenue-equivalence result it is immediate to verify that even for
generic scoring auctions there exists no prior-independent optimal score function in
the universal prior domain. Suppose ex absurdo that there exists a score function V 
that is prior-independent optimal in some scoring auction A, i.e. there exist no other
score function nor auction rules in the class of scoring auctions that allow to attain
a higher level of regulator expected welfare. Take now the subset of stochastically
independent priors: if the given score function is to be prior-independent optimal,
the dominance relation must hold for these too. Asker and Cantillon’s revenue-
equivalence result implies that with stochastically independent priors the auctioneer’s
expected welfare is the same both in auction A and in a second-score one under the
same score function: therefore if V  is prior-independent optimal under A it must be
so in the second-score auction too. But the latter is impossible, since by Proposition 1
such score functions never exist for second-score auctions unless mi = mj, and
hence do not exist in the set of stochastically independent priors either. Then a
fortiori there do not exist in the universal prior domain either, thus contradicting
the assumption that V  and auction mechanism A are prior-independent optimal
11in it. Note that by an argument similar to that of the previous subsection, this
negative conclusion actually holds for general welfare functions whose values depend
on the winner’s type too, w(p;m;F)   s. All this is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 (Impossibility in the universal prior domain) In environments
where cost functions display the single-crossing property there exist no prior-independent
optimal score functions over the universal prior domain for any kind of scoring auc-
tion.
In conclusion, if we look for a prior-independent optimal score function in the
universal domain of priors, or in other words if the decision-maker has no a priori
information at all about ﬁrms’ costs, there is no solution under whatever scoring
auction. But again, if the auctioneer has some ex ante information that allows to
restrict the prior ﬁeld appropriately, there do exist auctions that are prior-independent
optimal in the restricted domain and over any scoring auction, not only second-score
ones, as we show in the next section.
5 Optimal generic auctions in a restricted domain
From now on we assume that the regulator, though ignoring the exact prior shape,
has the following a priori information: 1) mi = mj for every i;j, 2) ﬁxed costs
Fi are equally and independently distributed according to a generic distribution
function Fi 7! G(Fi) with density Fi 7! g(Fi), which is also common knowledge to
ﬁrms, 3) m and Fi are stochastically independent. Note that to analyse this case
we cannot apply Asker and Cantillon’s equivalence result, since individual types
i are not stochastically independent, and then we have to prove an ad hoc result.
Since all ﬁrms have the same m and the only uncertain parameters for them are
their competitors’ ﬁxed costs, we can calculate the expected value of a given score
function with respect to G() in the usual way. That is, we ﬁrst work out the
winner’s expected proﬁt by applying the revelation principle. Then we verify through
standard diﬀerential methods that any two auction mechanisms that induce the same
ex-post allocation are equivalent in terms of expected score (for the proof see the
appendix).
Lemma 3 (“Revenue equivalence”) If mi = m for all i, m and Fi are stochasti-
cally independent and moreover Fi are i.i.d., all auctions with the same score function
additively separable in s that award the contract to a ﬁrm with the lowest Fi and
entail the same tariﬀ outcome m 7! p(m) realize the same expected value of the
score function.
The lemma establishes the equivalence with respect to expected score of all
auction rules that: 1) are eﬃcient (i.e. the lowest type Fi wins and the highest type
has a null probability of winning), 2) induce the same tariﬀ function m 7! p(m)
as outcome. Now note that both ﬁrst- and second-score have the two properties.
Since parameter mi is equal for all ﬁrms, the winner in both ﬁrst- and second-score
auctions is the bidder with the lowest Fi (the probability of winning is (1 G(Fi))n 1).
12Moreover, given any separable score function of the type V (p;s)  v(p)   s, in ﬁrst-
and second-score auctions the tariﬀ is
p(m) = argmaxp

v(p) + py(p)   c(y(p);m)   Fi    V

for every m, irrespective of the score  V to be met by the winner (this is actually true
for any nth score auction). Then by Lemma 3 ﬁrst- and second-score auctions are
equivalent in terms of expected score. Moreover, there is no other auction that can
do better in expected terms than ﬁrst- and second-score ones (or, for that matters,
than any eﬃcient auction with the same tariﬀ outcomes): welfare functions additively
separable in s dominate any other scoring criterion in ﬁrst-score auctions for any
distribution function G() too. To see this, suppose ex absurdo that there exists
a score function that obtains a higher expected welfare under the ﬁrst-score rule.
By the equivalence result just established dominance should also hold under the
second-score rule but this would contradict Lemma 2, which asserts the reverse
dominance order state by state and hence in expected value as well.
The reason is intuitively clear if one considers that the tariﬀ implemented under
them is ex-post eﬃcient, whereby gross social surplus is the largest possible, and the
selected bidder is that with the lowest Fi, which implies that social surplus net of
ﬁxed costs is maximized too. For an auction rule to improve on ﬁrst- and second-score
ones in terms of the regulator’s welfare, it would be necessary that it pushed down the
contractor’s expected proﬁts. But, whatever the prior, such an auction mechanism
does not exist, since in the present conditions to ensure incentive compatibility the
contractor must always be granted the same expected proﬁt, irrespective of the
auction rules (score function). Therefore, for the regulator there is nothing better
than an auction that obtains the highest social welfare in every state, as both ﬁrst-
and second-score auctions actually do when bids are scored in terms of social welfare.
In other words, ﬁrst- and second-score auctions are optimal in expected welfare with
respect to any distribution function G(). All this is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 With mi = m for all i, ﬁxed costs i.i.d. across ﬁrms and social
welfare additively separable in s, ﬁrst- and second-score auctions which use the social
welfare function to score bids are optimal in expected welfare with respect to any
distribution function G().
Under the proposition’s conditions second-score and ﬁrst-score auctions with
social welfare as score function are optimal irrespective of the prior and can thus
be used interchangeably by a non-Bayesian regulator who just knows that Fi’s are
independent and that variable-cost functions do not vary signiﬁcantly across ﬁrms.
Note that these auctions (or for that matters any auction where the most eﬃcient
bidder wins and an ex-post eﬃcient allocation is implemented) are optimal not only
over other scoring auctions but also over any mechanism, i.e. there is no mechanism,
however structured, that can improve on them.
That prior-independent optimal score functions exist in particular environments
is not a novelty. Che’s (1993) results for instance imply that they exist under
the assumption that all ﬁrms have the same variable cost parameter and this is
known with certainty by everybody (cf. Remark 1 above). Che’s model, however, is
13unable to say anything about the possibility of prior-independent optimality when
the assumption is relaxed and speciﬁcally whether the equality of variable cost
parameters across ﬁrms keeps playing a role when the principal is uncertain both
about marginal and ﬁxed costs. Here we have made a step forward by identifying a
general class of environments—single-crossing ones—where the equality property is
necessary and suﬃcient for prior-independent optimality.
So far we have worked with welfare functions that do not depend on the state of
the world. Now let us go back to Eq. (1). The previous results directly apply to it
for  = 0 and ensure that when mi = m for all i, the regulator should simply use
the net consumer surplus
^ W(p;s) = CS(p)   s (2)
to score bids. But what if social welfare depends also on ﬁrms’ proﬁts besides
consumer surplus, i.e.  > 0? As a matter of fact the answer does not change: net
consumer surplus remains optimal for scoring bids. To see this, suppose for a moment
that the regulator knows the state of the world ((m;F1);:::;(m;Fn)) with certainty.
Since nothing in Lemma 2 depends on whether welfare is aﬀected or not by the state
of the world, the lemma holds for general welfare functions (p;s) 7! W(p;s;m;Fi)
too. In other words, by the argument of Lemma 2, we can rule out the existence
of a V supporting better outcomes than those obtained by employing W as score
function. Of course, the problem is that the regulator actually ignores the state of the
world and W cannot be used in practice. However, net consumer surplus Eq. (2) is
equivalent to Eq. (1), since the second-score auction outcome is the same under both
of them in every state of the world. Therefore, net consumer surplus is optimal among
all score functions even with  > 0. The intuition is straightforward. In second-score
auctions the winning ﬁrm’s proﬁt is always equal to (F2   F1) irrespective of the
equilibrium tariﬀ, i.e. a change in the score function can only aﬀect the implemented
tariﬀ and the consumer surplus. Then, if the latter has a positive impact on welfare,
however small, a score function that induces the highest possible consumer surplus
is a solution to the problem. From Lemma 2 we know that to obtain the highest
consumer surplus the trick is to use it to score bids: therefore, even when social
welfare is speciﬁed as Eq. (1), it is in fact enough to adopt Eq. (2) as score function
(for a formal proof see the appendix).
In the previous analysis a critical role is played by the equality of variable cost
functions across ﬁrms. It is then natural at this point to ask how likely such a situation
is in regulatory practice. A brief discussion of the point will suﬃce here. Take for
example service contracts for the operation of bus lines. Such contracts usually
impose on the contractor the duty to drive certain routes with given frequency, i.e. to
total a ﬁxed amount of kilometres per time unit. In these circumstances the marginal
service cost—that here coincides with the cost of an extra passenger/kilometre—is
unlikely to diﬀer signiﬁcantly across potential contractors, since it essentially reﬂects
variations in fuel consumption and tyre wear which can hardly diﬀer among them. By
contrast, ﬁxed costs depend on the eﬃciency of the ﬁrm’s overall organization which
can considerably vary from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. Therefore cost diﬀerentials among potential
contractors, if any, are in this case to be ascribed to ﬁxed costs only. Similar remarks
hold for other services of akin nature like waste disposal and also for some that are
entirely diﬀerent from transportation. Let us consider by way of example a contract
for building and exploiting a bridge (but the same argument applies to motorways,
14tunnels, etc.). Construction entails large ﬁxed (sunk) costs which may vary sensibly
across potential contractors according to their eﬃciency. Operating costs are mostly
ﬁxed (non-sunk) too: the bridge requires the employment of so many surveillance
staﬀ, the light of so many lamp columns, etc., irrespective of how many vehicles cross
it, unless it is kept closed (in which case these costs are zero). Maintenance costs
are instead partially variable with use (like e.g. the cost of asphalt paving) but the
variable part is again unlikely to diﬀer signiﬁcantly across potential contractors, who
usually contract out maintenance and have access to the same subcontractors. These
remarks suggest that the equality of variable cost functions across ﬁrms is not an
unlikely event in public services markets and therefore prior-independent optimality
is a potentially relevant choice criterion for auction practice in this ﬁeld.
6 An extension
The main upshot of the previous analysis is that a completely ignorant regulator will
be unable to act according to the prior-independent optimality criterion, given the
lack of an optimal score function in the universal prior domain. However, if there is
available a priori information that allows to restrict the prior domain appropriately,
there may indeed exist constrained solutions according to this criterion too and even a
non-Bayesian regulator may be able to make a fully rational choice. For an important
class of environments we have characterized the structural conditions and the a priori
information required for a non-Bayesian regulator to implement a prior-independent
optimal auction: under the single-crossing property for cost functions, the only case
where (constrained) prior-independent optimal score functions exist is when variable
cost parameters do not vary across ﬁrms. Therefore, when the latter do not meet
this requirement or the regulator is completely ignorant about them, there will be
needed weaker optimality criteria than prior-independence. This topic is left to
future research but before closing we want to discuss a further problem that may
arise in practice.
Our model’s basic prescription is that, when certain conditions are met—essentially
mi = m for all i—, bids must be scored by the social welfare function. Of course,
such a procedure is viable only if the welfare function is known to the regulator
but this is not always the case. As is usual in regulation theory, we have so far
assumed that production costs are uncertain to him while market demand is common
knowledge. By contrast it is not implausible that a regulator who is ignorant about
ﬁrms’ costs is ignorant about market demand too. The problem is that in such a case
the social welfare function Eq. (1) is unknown too and, even if it is prior-independent
optimal as score function, it cannot be implemented.
There is more to it. The results of the previous sections apply not only to social
welfare functions (p;s) 7! W(p;s) but actually to any function (p;s) 7! V (p;s)
that were taken as the regulator’s objective. This means that any score function
is prior-independent optimal with respect to itself in the restricted prior domain
identiﬁed by mi = m for all i. In order to distinguish generic objectives V (p;s)
from the social welfare function we call them pseudo-objectives. From a practical
standpoint, the regulator knows that in such a situation, whatever score function he
chooses, he will behave as if he optimized that function as pseudo-objective, i.e. he
will get the best outcome with respect to it. As a matter of fact, he may even
15occasionally attain a social optimum but he can never know whether this is the case
and, if not, how big the welfare losses associated to diﬀerent scoring rules are: what
the regulator knows is just that in choosing a certain score function, in fact he sets
it as his maximand.
This clearly poses a new problem to the regulator—to make a reasoned choice of
the pseudo-objective. That is, instead of assessing diﬀerent score functions against a
given a priori natural objective, he is now to evaluate the merits of diﬀerent pseudo-
objectives in order to ﬁnd a reasonable one to implement. Hence, the regulator’s
question is no longer “by what instruments can I pursue my given objective?” but
“which objective am I to pursue?”. It is to be noted that the latter is extraneous
to standard mechanism theory and the design problem here essentially reduces to
making value judgements about alternative objectives. To gain a better grasp of the
problem let us see an example.
Example. Service contracts sometimes set a rigid capacity constraint on supply.
Consider a contract whose object is the operation of a parking lot: the number of
parking hours “produced” per day is equal to the number of parking places times
the daily opening hours and not a single hour more can be made available by the
given facility (it is irrelevant here if the parking facility already exists or must be
built under the contract: a BOT contract which sets a given size for a parking lot
to be built presents the same problems as contracts for the operation of an existing
one). The maximum capacity  y of course coincides with the ﬁxed service supply and
all costs are here ﬁxed (c( y;m) is an uncertain constant). In these circumstances
the ﬁrst-best tariﬀ is P( y) if y(0) >  y, where y 7! P(y) is the inverse of the demand
function, and 0 if y(0) <  y. Then, if market demand is completely unknown, the
ﬁrst-best tariﬀ is not computable by the regulator. The production capacity, however,
can be used to deﬁne scores in many ways, like e.g.
K(p;s) = p y + s (3)
which represents the maximum cost—subsidy plus tariﬀ times maximum capacity—
that citizens commit themselves to bear for a maximum capacity equal to  y when
the contract awarded through an auction is (p;s). Since Eq. (3) is a cost, score
function/pseudo-objective K() is obviously to be minimized, not maximized, and
hence the regulator’s objective will be to minimize the maximum cost of service.
Minimizing pseudo-objective K() is the same as maximizing  K() and the latter
is monotonic decreasing in both variables, continuous and additively separable. Then,
if mi = m for all i, Lemma 2 applies to this function and, in order to minimize the
expected value of maximum service cost, the regulator has just to run a second-score
auction or equivalently a ﬁrst-score auction, if ﬁxed costs are i.i.d. too (Proposition 3),
in both of which the winner is the bidder whose bid solves mini(pi y + si).
Can such a score function be judged reasonable? In the absence of any information
on service use, it is not implausible that citizens may indeed consider reasonable to
minimize the maximum cost of service supply but even this simple objective admits
several speciﬁcations and Eq. (3) is just one. For instance, if the whole subsidy is
paid upfront, one can make a more precise estimate of the maximum cost of service
for society by replacing the right-hand member of Eq. (3) with [p y + (1 + r)s], where
r is an appropriate interest rate that measures the cost of capital advance (this
16speciﬁcation corresponds to payment of the subsidy in this period and payment of
the tariﬀ in the next one; of course any other timing structure can be allowed for by
modifying it suitably). A further alternative is to allow for the shadow cost of public
funds,  (subsidies are usually ﬁnanced through distortionary taxes) by transforming
the right-hand member of Eq. (3) into [p y + (1 + )s], and others can be found in
similar ways. What we have here is the situation that will typically be faced by the
regulator: several alternative pseudo-objectives—all of them plausible—among which
a choice is to be made. This problem is too complex to be addressed here but one point
is clear enough. If the conditions identiﬁed by the previous analysis occur, choosing a
score function amounts to choosing the pseudo-objective pursued and both regulator
and citizens fully know what society will attain even under severe ignorance. Then
an obvious minimal requirement in these circumstances is that the decision-maker
explain to citizens why maximizing the chosen pseudo-objective is more desirable
than maximizing others. Trivial though it may appear, the requirement has a relevant
implication for practice: in order to be communicated, the choice must in fact be
restricted to objectives that have a plain economic meaning—like minimizing the
maximum cost of service—easily understandable to citizens. The example also shows
a further fact that is worth stressing: sometimes satisfactory auction design can
be accomplished just by good sense without resorting to complicated calculations,
contrary to the impression auction theory often conveys to laymen.
7 Conclusions
The paper provides a few basic insights into the parsimonious design of multidimen-
sional auctions. We have started from the extreme situation where the principal
knows nothing at all about its potential counterparts’ costs and tried to apply the
most demanding choice criterion of all—prior-independent optimality. We have shown
is that complete ignorance is incompatible with it but also that, on the other hand,
prior-independent optimization does admit constrained solutions when a minimum
amount of a priori information about cost structure is available to the regulator. In
particular we have characterized the structural conditions and the least amount of
information for this to be possible—in short that cost variations among ﬁrms be
imputable to diﬀerences in ﬁxed costs.
Our analysis traces the boundaries beyond which the criterion of prior-independent
optimality becomes useless and weaker choice criteria or learning mechanisms are
needed. One direction for future research is to assay if the criterion can be slackened
in some way to be applicable to more general environments. Approximate optimality
is a possible answer: if diﬀerences in variable cost functions across ﬁrms are suﬃciently
small, we expect that the social welfare function, though not exactly prior-independent
optimal, might be approximately so and an interesting task is to determine which
conditions, structural and informational, guarantee approximate implementation
by an ignorant regulator. A further question raised by our analysis is the choice
of pseudo-objectives. As we have seen, when ignorance concerns market demand
too, the regulator is in some cases called to make a choice of the pseudo-objective
he pursues: such a choice can hardly be rational but ought to be reasonable in
some sense and appropriate criteria are needed to deﬁne reasonableness in this
context. A last problem to which we draw attention is the limitation of the present
17analysis to scoring auctions. These are some of the most frequently used formats for
multidimensional auctions but certainly not the only ones. A possible cause of their
diﬀusion is that they are simple to understand and use in practice but the fact is
that theory has very little to say in this regard. What are the exact reasons that
make one prefer these mechanisms over others? And more basically: are we sure that
there are no other mechanisms as simple as scoring auctions but better than them in
some circumstances? Of course, such questions can ﬁnd no answer here since the
scoring-auction format has been assumed as an a priori constraint of the analysis
and more general models will be needed to make advances in this direction.
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Lemma 4 In second-score auctions if in some state (mi;Fi)i2I the second-ranked bid
under score function V is not an optimal choice for the winner and the implemented
contract yields strictly positive proﬁts, V is not a pointwise-optimal score function.
Proof. Let a denote the contract implemented in state (mi;Fi)i2I by a second-score
auction under score function V , i.e.
a 2 argmaxV (p;s)>V  (1)(p;s);
where subscript (i) denotes the i-th ranked bidder and V   V (b(2)), with the
second-ranked bid b(2) deﬁned as
b(2) 2 argmax(2)=0 V (p;s):
Note that to avoid cumbersome notation we keep implicit the state of the world on
which a and b(2) depend. Notation can be further simpliﬁed by assuming without
loss of generality that the ﬁrst- and second-ranked bidders are respectively 1 and 2,
whereby index i can be used in place of index (i).
Recall that by assumption 1(a) > 0. Moreover, by assumption we also have
b2 = 2 argmaxV (p;s)>V  1(p;s), i.e. a 6= b2, which implies pa 6= pb2, for V is strictly
decreasing in s (the equilibrium condition V (pa;sa) = V (pb2;sb2) can be satisﬁed
for sa 6= sb2 only if pa 6= pb2). In these circumstances there always exists a point
c 2 [0;1[R such that
1(c) > 0
^ W(c) > ^ W(b2)
and 1(c) > 1(b2): since by assumption 1(a) > 1(b2), c can be chosen so close to a
that the second bid lies below bidder 1’s isoproﬁt curve of level 1(c) (for example we
can set c = a+(0; ) = (pa;sa)+(0; ); > 0 and, given 1(pa;sa ) = 1(a) ,
 can be chosen so that 1(a) >  > 1(a)=2). Strict monotonicity of ^ W in s ensures
^ W(c) > ^ W(b2).
Let  i(p)  py(p)   c(y(p);mi)   Fi denote the operational proﬁts (commercial
revenue minus cost) and consider the following functions of p
p 7!   1(p) + d1
p 7!   2(p)
where d1 is chosen so that   1(pa)+d1 = 1(a) . Note that, given the continuity
of the two functions, the minimum function p 7! minf  1(p) + d1;  2(p)g  h(p)
is continuous too. Then deﬁne  : [0;1[! R such that
(pc) = 0
(pb2) = 0
(p) < 0;p 6= pb2;pc
(functions with such characteristics, even belonging to class C1 ([0;1[), can be
deﬁned without diﬃculty) and a function ~ V such that
~ V (p;s)  h(p) + (p)   s:
19Figure 4: Construction of a score function ~ V that dominates a
generic V in some state.
It is immediate to see that ~ V is continuous and has value 0 if and only if
h(p) + (p) = s. Moreover, ~ V (p;h(p))  (p) 6 0 (that is, it is always < 0 except at
pc and pb2). Therefore points c and b2 are maximizers of ~ V for s > h(p), since
~ V (p;s)  h(p) + (p)   s 6 h(p) + (p)   h(p) = (p) 6 0;
and this proves the existence of an iso-score curve like ~ V in Fig. 4. By translating
the curve vertically we get a score function ~ V : [0;1[R ! R that dominates V in
the state of the world under consideration and therefore we can conclude that in the
given conditions V is not pointwise optimal.

Proof of Proposition 1.
(Suﬃciency) The suﬃciency part is an immediate implication of Lemma 2.
(Necessity) Given any m1 and m2 such that m1 6= m2, there always exists a state
of the world where bidder 1 is the winner and bidder 2 is ranked second: to ﬁnd
it simply set 2’s ﬁxed cost high enough for him to be second and all others’ costs
higher. Then if parameters mi are allowed to diﬀer across ﬁrms, there is always a
state of the world where the highest and the second-highest bidders have diﬀerent
variable-cost parameters.
It is immediate to verify that second-score auctions with a given score function
V cannot implement a contract a with 1(a) = 0 in every state of the world in which
m1 6= m2. In second-score auctions this case occurs only if both the ﬁrst and the
second bid are equilibrium ones in some state (i.e. there is a “tie”), i.e.
V (p
1;s






i)  argmax(p;s;mi;Fi)=0 V (p;s);i = 1;2:
If in some state Eq. (4) holds, there exists an equilibrium where 1 wins and im-
plements contract (p
1;s
1): since V (p
1;s
1) = V (p
2;s
2) is the highest score sub-
ject to the zero-proﬁt constraint, it is impossible to attain higher proﬁts under
the constraint V (p1;s1) = V (p
2;s
2). Similarly, there exists a second equilibrium
where 2 wins and implements (p
2;s
2). Of course for ﬁxed costs F1   " > 0;" > 0
we have (p
1;s
1   ";m1;F1   ") = 0 and V (p
1;s
1   ") > V (p
2;s
2), i.e. in state
((m1;F1   ");(m2;F2);:::) there is no tie. We have thus proved that for any V there
are states of the world with m1 6= m2 in which contract a implemented through
a second-score auction does not meet 1(a) = 0, i.e. there are states where the
winner realizes strictly positive proﬁts, 1(a) > 0. The same argument holds when
the winner is any i and the second is any j (i.e. there are states in which any
couple of bidders is ranked in this way). Since the single-crossing property implies
that in no state of the world the second bid is an optimal choice for the winner
(b = 2 argmaxV (p;s)>V  1(p;s)), Lemma 4 applies to every state (mi;Fi)i2I such that
mi 6= mj for some i;j. Then we can conclude that no V is pointwise optimal if mi
are not equal across ﬁrms in all states of the world. 
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof is based on the diﬀerential method of equilibrium
analysis introduced by Milgrom (1989, 1985) (here all functions are assumed diﬀer-
entiable). Since m is common knowledge to ﬁrms, each ﬁrm i is uncertain about
(F1;:::;Fi 1;Fi+1;:::;Fn). Variable m is a common parameter of ﬁrms’ choices
and therefore we can represent the problem as if we had as many auctions as the
values of m. Given the optimal winning probability (m;Fi), the optimal expected
proﬁt for a generic ﬁrm of type Fi is
(m;Fi) = (m;Fi)[p(m;Fi)y(p(m;Fi)) + s(m;Fi)   c(y(p(m;Fi));m)   Fi]
By the Envelope Theorem we have
0
F(m;Fi) =  (m;Fi)





((m;  Fi) = 0: the probability of winning for the worst type  Fi is null and so is
the optimal expected proﬁt in  Fi). Therefore a generic bidder’s expected proﬁt








The winner’s expected proﬁt is therefore nEF((m;Fi)). In all auctions awarded
to the lowest Fi (given m) the winning probability (m;Fi) = [1   G(Fi)]
n 1 is
the same and so is the expected proﬁt conditional on m. The conventional surplus,
deﬁned as
[v(p) + py(p)   c(y;m)   Fi];
21is in expected value the same in all auctions that select the most eﬃcient ﬁrm and







p(m;F(1))y(p(m;F(1))) + s(m;F(1))   c(y(p(m;F(1)));m)   F(1)
o
where F(1) is the ﬁrst-order statistics of F. The sum in square brackets is the winner’s
expected proﬁt, which is equal across all auctions under consideration. Then, by





and its expected value with respect to m are equal too. 
Equivalence of welfare functions derived from social surplus
First we verify that net consumer surplus is equivalent to Eq. (1) as score function, in
the sense that, even if the regulator knew each bidder’s parameters and were able to
compute the social welfare Eq. (1) for each bid, the outcome of second-score auctions
awarded in this way would be the same as if he used net consumer surplus as score
function. So for the argument’s sake suppose that the regulator knows the state of
the world (mi;Fi)i2I at the moment of evaluating bids. To prove equivalence we
must ascertain that in switching from a score function to the other there is no change
in: a) the winner, b) the implemented contract.
It is immediate to verify that the winner does not change with the score function.
Denote operational proﬁts (i.e. net of subsidy)  (p;m;F)  py(p)   c(y(p);m)   F
and let (p
i;s
i) be a solution to
max
p;s [CS(p)   s +  (p;mi;Fi) + s)] (5)
subject to
s +  (p;mi;Fi) = 0:
Since by Eq. (5)
CS(p
i)   s













then the ordering of bidders is the same both under Eqs. (1) and (2) as score functions.
Let us now turn to the second problem. Assume that under both score function
the winner is 1 (identiﬁed by (m1;F1)) and the second-highest is 2 (m2;F2). The
second-highest bid is a solution to
maxp;s [CS(p)   s +  (p;m2;F2) + s)] (6)
subject to
s +  (p;m2;F2) = 0
22Firm 2’s tariﬀ is clearly also a solution to
maxp [CS(p) +  (p;m2;F2)]
i.e. it maximizes social surplus irrespective of . Denote W
2 the social welfare
associated to the second-highest bid. The tariﬀ implemented in equilibrium is a
solution of
maxp;s (p;s;m1;F1) (7)
subject to CS(p)   s + ( (p;m1;F1) + s) = W






(CS(p) +  (p;m1;F1)   W
2)












Therefore the outcome tariﬀ p(m1) does not vary with parameter , nor does the
outcome subsidy s(m1;F1). In other words, it is the same that would obtain by
applying the consumer surplus as score function, i.e. by solving Eqs. (6) and (7) for
 = 0.
The last task is to check that when we use (p;s) 7! CS(p) s to score bids there
exists no other (p;s) 7! V (p;s) that allows to attain a better outcome with respect
to the social welfare CS(p)   s + (p;s;m;F) in some state. If the regulator knew
the state of the world, he could use W(p;s;m;F)  CS(p)   s + (p;s;m;F) as
score function. Since both welfare and proﬁt functions are vertical translations when
mi = m for all i, the implemented contract and the second bid coincide and the
argument of Lemma 2 can be applied state by state to this function too. This means
that there exists no score function V under which the auction outcome obtains a
strictly higher welfare CS(p)   s + (p;s;m;F). But, since net consumer surplus
CS(p) s allows to attain the same outcomes as W in every state, there exists no V
that strictly dominate the former in terms of welfare CS(p)   s + (p;s;m;F). In
conclusion, by resorting to Eq. (2) there is no loss due to the informational constraint
that makes Eq. (1) actually unusable for scoring bids.
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